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ABSTRACT
The evolution of cooperation often depends upon population structure, yet nearly all models of coop-
eration implicitly assume that this structure remains static. This is a simplifying assumption, since most
organisms possess genetic traits that affect their population structure to some degree. These traits, such
as a group size preference, affect the relatedness of interacting individuals and hence the opportunity for
kin or group selection. We argue that models which do not explicitly consider their evolution cannot
provide a satisfactory account of the origin of cooperation, since they cannot explain how the prerequisite
population structures arise. Here we consider the concurrent evolution of genetic traits that affect popu-
lation structure, with those that affect social behaviour. We show that not only does population structure
drive social evolution, as in previous models, but that the opportunity for cooperation can in turn drive the
creation of population structures that support it. This occurs through the generation of linkage disequilib-
rium between socio-behavioural and population-structuring traits, such that direct kin selection on social
behaviour creates indirect selection pressure on population structure. We illustrate our argument with a
model of the concurrent evolution of group size preference and social behaviour. [This is a post-print of
an accepted manuscript published in Evolution 65(6) pp. 1527-1543, June 2011. The publisher’s version
is available from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1558-5646.2011.01250.x/full.]
Subject headings: group size, relatedness, kin selection, multi-level selection, linkage disequilibrium, Snowdrift game
It is widely appreciated that population structure
drives the evolution of social traits. Cooperative be-
haviours, that benefit other individuals at some cost
to the actor, can evolve if the population structure
is such that the benefits of cooperation fall upon
other cooperators, rather than being distributed uni-
formly (Hamilton 1964; Michod and Sanderson 1985;
Lehmann and Keller 2006; Fletcher and Doebeli 2009).
Over the past 50 years, social evolution theory has fo-
cussed on determining the range of population struc-
tures that can support cooperation (e.g., Maynard Smith
1964; Levin and Kilmer 1974; Wilson 1975, 1987;
Nowak and May 1992; Mitteldorf and Wilson 2000;
Hauert and Doebeli 2004; Peck 2004; El Mouden et al.
2010). For example, cooperation might be selec-
tively favoured if organisms live in groups below a
certain size, and selfish behaviour favoured in larger
groups (Levin and Kilmer 1974; Wilson and Colwell
1981). Crucially, such models assume that popula-
tion structure is not directly affected by individual
traits (although some models do allow for an elas-
tic population structure, such that the average level
of cooperation within a group affects group size
(Grafen 2007; Wild et al. 2009) or dispersal proba-
bility (Pepper and Smuts 2002)). This means that co-
operation can then simply be viewed as the adaptation
of organisms’ social behaviour to the social environ-
ment that they find themselves in. What such models
cannot explain, however, is why organisms live in a
population structure that supports a certain level of co-
operation. We argue that answering this question is
necessary in order to explain the evolutionary origin
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of cooperation, for a satisfactory account of the origin
of cooperation must explain why a social environment
that selects for cooperative interactions exists.
Population structure is the product not only of
environmental factors, but also of individual be-
haviours. Many of these behaviours that affect pop-
ulation structure have a genetic basis, and so are them-
selves subject to natural selection. For example, the
evolution of individual traits that affect group size
(Rodman 1981; Koenig 1981; Giraldeau and Caraco
2000; Kokko et al. 2001), dispersal rate (Johnson and Gaines
1990), or aspects of the mating system (Orians 1969;
Emlen and Oring 1977) have all been considered in
the literature. Despite this, however, there have been
very few treatments that consider how their evolution
is affected by selection pressures on (individually-
costly) cooperative behaviour. Here, we generalise
the small body of literature that has considered par-
ticular cases in which social behaviour co-evolves
with the mating system (Peck and Feldman 1988;
Breden and Wade 1991), group size (Avile´s 2002), or
dispersal rate (Le Galliard et al. 2005; Hochberg et al.
2008). Specifically, we present here a general logical
argument which demonstrates that the benefits of co-
operation can drive the evolution of population struc-
ture, leading to the creation of population structures
that support cooperative behaviour. We then illustrate
our general argument with a numerical model that con-
siders the concurrent evolution of cooperation with a
particular population-structuring trait; specifically, a
preference for the number of individuals that found
a group (which we refer to as founding size). Us-
ing this model, we are able to show conditions under
which organisms can evolve from living in a popula-
tion structure that supports little cooperation (i.e. large
interaction groups, being approximately equivalent to
no population structure, where selfish behaviour dom-
inates), to one where cooperative behaviour predomi-
nates. We thus consider a population structure that ini-
tially approaches freely-mixed conditions, where indi-
viduals have fitness-affecting interactions with many
others, and then show how greater interaction structure
can evolve. Specifically, this illustrates how evolution
of an individual group size preference can increase
between-group variance / genetic relatedness (group
and kin selection are equivalent ways of understand-
ing the selection pressures that population structure
exerts on social traits (Hamilton 1975; Queller 1992;
Foster et al. 2006; Foster 2006; Lehmann et al. 2007);
see Discussion section).
Our approach is in contrast to recent work by Avile´s
(2002), which shows how solitaires can evolve to
live in groups (i.e., how a starting group size of 1
can evolve upwards). This fundamental difference is
explained by the type of cooperative act that the re-
spective models seek to explain. Specifically, Avile´s
considers facultative types of social interaction, i.e.,
some task that it is possible to do alone but which can
be done more efficiently in a group (van Veelen et al.
2010). By contrast, we consider obligatory social in-
teractions, where it is a fact of life that organisms must
interact with others (but not that the interaction is co-
operative). For example, it is usually not possible for
an organism to be a solitaire with respect to common
resources, and resource usage rate can create a social
dilemma with cooperative and selfish strategies (Kreft
2004; Zea-Cabrera et al. 2006). Likewise, a micro-
organism may need to produce extra-cellular goods
to survive (Varma and Chincholkar 2007; Gore et al.
2009); the fact that they are extracellular means that
they are shared with others, automatically creating a
social trait-group structure (Wilson 1975, 1980). In
such cases of obligatory social interactions, where or-
ganisms cannot be solitaires, the evolution of pop-
ulation structure means the refinement of an always
present trait-group structure. A group size of one
would therefore be an invalid starting assumption
for such interactions. Our approach to the evolu-
tion of group size is also fundamentally different to
other recent work in this area, such as models of
optimal group size in the context of social forag-
ing (Giraldeau and Caraco 2000), or group augmenta-
tion during cooperative breeding (Kokko et al. 2001).
These works consider how direct fitness benefits (for
example, due to an Allee effect increasing individ-
ual fitness with group size; Allee 1938; Avile´s 1999)
of being in a group can drive group size upwards.
By contrast, we focus on indirect benefits that arise
through increased kin or group selection for greater
(individually-costly) cooperation. That is, we show
how the benefits of cooperation can drive the evolu-
tion of structures that increase relatedness, and hence
create the conditions for effective kin selection.
The kind of social interactions that we consider can
be readily modelled using the Prisoner’s Dilemma and
Snowdrift games. Such evolutionary game theoretic
models are commonly used to conceptualise problems
of cooperation across taxa (Maynard Smith 1982), in-
cluding in the literature on cooperation in animals,
humans, and microbes (Grafen 1979; Dugatkin 1990;
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Nowak and May 1992; Frick and Schuster 2003; Greig and Travisano
2004; Doebeli and Hauert 2005; Kun et al. 2006;
Ku¨mmerli et al. 2007; Gore et al. 2009; Stark 2010),
and can handle interactions in groups of size n as
well as between pairs of individuals. In particu-
lar, the n-player Prisoner’s Dilemma provides a sim-
ple way to model directional selection within social
groups favouring selfish behaviour (and is the im-
plicit assumption in most models of social evolu-
tion (Fletcher and Zwick 2007)), whilst the Snowdrift
game provides a simple model of negative frequency-
dependent selection leading to a polymorphism of self-
ish cheats and cooperative individuals within a group
(Doebeli and Hauert 2005). Examples of where selec-
tion on social behaviour may be negative frequency-
dependent in this way can be found across taxa
and include enzyme secretion in yeast (Gore et al.
2009) and viruses, antibiotic resistance in bacteria
(Dugatkin et al. 2003, 2005a), social foraging in spi-
der colonies (Pruitt and Riechert 2009), and sentinel
behaviour in mammals (see also Doebeli and Hauert
2005 for a review). Our model illustrates that the dif-
ference between directional and frequency-dependent
selection on social behaviour has a profound effect
on the evolution of population structure. Specifically,
evolution of population structure in the direction that
increases cooperation can occur from a much larger
range of conditions where social interactions are of
the Snowdrift type, that is, where selection supports a
polymorphism of social behaviours within a group.
The benefits of cooperation can drive the evolution
of population structure
Peck and Feldman (1988) and Breden and Wade
(1991) argue that cooperation can drive the evolu-
tion of population structure, for the specific case of
evolution of aspects of the mating system. Here, we
develop a general argument that applies in principle to
any heritable trait that affects an aspect of the popula-
tion structure of its bearers. On the one hand, it may
seem obvious that a population structure which sup-
ports cooperation would be preferred over one which
does not, since cooperation by definition raises abso-
lute individual fitness. On the other hand, individual
selection responds to relative and not absolute fitness,
and selfish individuals by definition have a greater rel-
ative fitness than those cooperators which they exploit.
Therefore, one might expect that selfish individuals
will prevail due to their relative fitness advantage, and
create population structures which support themselves
rather than cooperators. Accordingly, the result of con-
current evolution between social traits and population-
structuring traits is not obvious. But, below we argue
that linkage disequilibrium will be generated between
these two types of traits, and that this allows the mean
fitness advantage of cooperation to be realised.
Consider two possible population structures, such
as two different group sizes or two different mating
systems. Suppose that structure A causes selection
to favour more cooperative behaviour amongst its in-
habitants, while structure a causes selection for more
selfish behaviour. For example, structure A might be
a smaller initial group size (Levin and Kilmer 1974;
Wilson and Colwell 1981), or a greater degree of in-
breeding (Wade and Breden 1981). Furthermore, con-
sider organisms that posses two heritable traits, the
first of which controls their social behaviour (coop-
erative or selfish), and the second controls the popu-
lation structure that they live in (A or a). If the two
traits start off in linkage equilibrium, then linkage dis-
equilibrium between them will evolve, by the follow-
ing logic. The more cooperative allele will increase
in frequency more in structure A than it does in struc-
ture a. Moreover, the individuals that live in structure
A are those that carry the A population-structuring al-
lele. Thus, the A structuring allele will exhibit pos-
itive linkage disequilibrium with the more coopera-
tive behaviour, and conversely the a structuring allele
will exhibit positive linkage disequilibrium with the
more selfish behaviour. Since by definition coopera-
tion increases mean fitness, and cooperation has be-
come linked with the A structural trait, individuals with
the A structural trait have the component of their fitness
that is due to social behaviour (i.e., fitness affects from
interactions with others) increased, on average, com-
pared to individuals with the a trait. Thus the A struc-
tural allele, that supports cooperation, will increase in
frequency, all other factors being equal. Our argument
thus implies that selection on social behaviour can in-
duce an indirect component of selection on population-
structuring traits, through the generation of linkage
disequilibrium. Moreover, the component of selection
on population structure which derives from selection
on social behaviour must favour the creation of struc-
tures that support cooperation, rather than selfishness
(Powers 2010).
The above argument makes two critical but logi-
cal assumptions. The first of these is that individuals
with structural allele A find themselves living in struc-
ture A, whereas individuals with allele a find them-
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selves living in structure a. Essentially, what matters
is that a structural differential exists, such that indi-
viduals with allele A on average experience a different
population structure, and hence potentially a different
selective environment, to those with allele a. For ex-
ample, if the A allele coded for a greater degree of in-
breeding, then individuals with the A allele should in-
breed with a greater probability than individuals with-
out the allele (see Breden and Wade 1991). Likewise,
if the allele codes for a group size preference, then
individuals with a smaller group size preference al-
lele should, on average, find themselves in smaller
groups than individuals without the allele. If this
were not the case, then linkage disequilibrium would
not be generated between the socio-behavioural and
population-structuring alleles, and so selection on pop-
ulation structure would not be induced by the above
mechanism. The second key assumption is that the dif-
ferent population structures select for different levels
of cooperation. If this were not the case, for example
if both population structures selected for zero cooper-
ation, then selection could not act on population struc-
ture via the social trait.
In the model presented below, we consider the in-
troduction of new population-structuring alleles by
small mutations from existing ones. This model serves
to illustrate the logical argument presented above. It
also serves to elucidate what the assumptions of the ar-
gument mean for the specific case of group size evolu-
tion. In particular, it illustrates how the validity of the
second assumption is affected by the type of social in-
teraction (Prisoner’s Dilemma or Snowdrift game type
of cooperation; Doebeli and Hauert 2005). Finally, the
model demonstrates that a succession of small muta-
tions on group size can be selected and cause a popula-
tion to evolve from an initial group size little conducive
to cooperation, to one highly conducive to cooperative
behaviour.
The concurrent evolution of initial group size pref-
erence and public goods production
To illustrate the above argument, we consider
the concurrent evolution of the number of individu-
als that found a group (which we hereafter refer to
as founding size or simply group size) with public
goods production. Public goods are those produced by
an individual and shared with other group members
(Driscoll and Pepper 2010). They typically increase
the fitness of all group members, but at a unilateral
cost to the producer. Examples of such public goods
production are widespread in nature and include the
production of extra-cellular substances by microbes
(Griffin et al. 2004; Gore et al. 2009), and the shar-
ing of information by an individual with the rest of
its group, as occurs during predator inspection by
guppies (Dugatkin 1990), and alarm calls in flocks
of birds (Charnov and Krebs 1975). The production
of such goods is a type of cooperative behaviour
(West et al. 2007a) that is vulnerable to exploitation
by cheating non-producers, which reap the benefit of
the public good without contributing to it. This can
lead to a “Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin 1968;
Rankin et al. 2007), in which cheating non-producers
increase in frequency, even though this leads to a de-
cline in mean fitness.
However, the “tragedy” can potentially be averted
in a group-structured population. In group-structured
populations, individual selection on social behaviour
(kin selection) can be partitioned into two components
(Price 1972; Hamilton 1975; Wilson 1975), as follows.
First, within each social group cooperators may de-
cline in frequency due to exploitation by selfish cheats;
this is within-group selection (Wilson 1975). Second,
groups founded by different proportions of coopera-
tive individuals may grow to different sizes by the time
of dispersal, and hence contribute different numbers
of individuals into the migrant pool; this is between-
group selection (Wilson 1975). If groups with more
cooperators contribute more individuals into the mi-
grant pool, then cooperation may be able to evolve
despite its local disadvantage within groups (Wilson
1975; Wilson and Sober 1994).
The amount of cooperation that evolves in a partic-
ular case depends on the proportion of the total genetic
variance, at the locus for public goods production, that
is between groups (Wilson 1975; Hamilton 1975) (or
equivalently, the genetic relatedness of group members
(Queller 1992; Lehmann et al. 2007); see Discussion).
Any factor that increases the genetic variance between
groups will favour greater cooperation. These include
the founding group size, and the genealogical related-
ness of the founding members. Here, we investigate
how the size of social groups when they are formed
co-evolves with public goods production. Specifi-
cally, if groups are formed randomly then between-
group variance, and hence selection for cooperation,
is inversely proportional to the founding size (Wilson
1980). Founding group or colony size is influenced
by genetic traits in many taxa, and can hence evolve
4
by individual selection. Examples include queen
number in social insects (Ross and Carpenter 1991;
Tsuji and Tsuji 1996), and propagule size in colo-
nial single-celled organisms such as choanoflagellates
(Michod and Roze 2000), and bacteria in biofilms (see
Discussion). Indeed, the evolution of founding group
size in colonial single-celled organisms has been ar-
gued to be a fundamental part of the transition to multi-
cellularity (Michod and Roze 2000; Roze and Michod
2001).
The model
Our model is based on the classic “Haystack”,
or aggregation and dispersal, model initially de-
veloped by Maynard Smith (1964) and later ex-
panded into a general multi-level selection model
(e.g., Wilson and Colwell 1981, Wilson 1987 and
Fletcher and Zwick 2004). We model a population of
N haploid asexually reproducing organisms, that pe-
riodically aggregate to form social groups in which
the public good is shared. These groups stay to-
gether for T generations, before all individuals syn-
chronously disperse to form a global well-mixed mi-
grant pool, from which new groups are formed (eco-
logically, dispersal and mixing might be triggered
by local resource depletion, e.g. Wilson and Colwell
1981, Hochberg et al. 2008; synchronous dispersal is
assumed for ease of analysis). This process of group
formation, reproduction for T generations, and disper-
sal repeats for a number of cycles, D. Crucially we
allow the founding group size, and hence relatedness,
to evolve by individual selection. Thus, individual se-
lection may create large founding groups (hence with
low relatedness) that select for selfish behaviour, or
small founding groups (consequently with high relat-
edness) that select for cooperation.
Let t be a counter for the generations within groups
in a single aggregation and dispersal cycle; it thus
ranges from 0 to T , and is reset with every new cy-
cle. Then, let nt be the size of a group at generation
t. We denote the founding size of a new group at the
beginning of a cycle, nt=0, by z. This is influenced
by individual group size preferences, which we repre-
sent with a multi-allelic integer locus on an individ-
ual’s genotype, γ . We assume that, to a first approx-
imation, all individuals are able to form groups that
satisfy their size preference, such that the number of
groups of founding size z, Gz, is Nγ=z/z, where Nγ=z is
the number of individuals with group size preference
allele γ = z in the global population. An individual’s
genotype also contains a biallelic locus that codes for
their social behaviour, i.e., whether they are coopera-
tive and contribute to the public good, or are selfish
and do not. Thus, each size preference allele is paired
with a frequency of the cooperative allele (which can
be different for different size preference alleles), which
is used when determining the initial frequency of co-
operation in each group. Formally, the expected count
of groups of founding size z (assuming that there are
z or more individuals with size preference allele γ = z
in the population, otherwise the count is zero) with a
cooperators is given by the function h(z,a):
h(z,a) = Gz
[(Aγ=z
a
)(Nγ=z−Aγ=z
z−a
)
(Nγ=z
z
)
]
, (1)
where Gz is the total count of groups of founding
size z, calculated as described above, Aγ=z is the num-
ber of cooperators with size preference allele γ = z,
and Nγ=z is the total number of individuals (coopera-
tive and selfish) with size preference allele γ = z. The
term in square brackets is the hypergeometric distri-
bution of the cooperative allele to groups of founding
size z, and represents random sampling of individu-
als with a given size preference allele without replace-
ment, i.e., groups are not formed assortatively on so-
cial behaviour. Crucially, this distribution of social be-
haviours is taken only over individuals with size pref-
erence allele γ = z, rather than over the whole popu-
lation. This means that if linkage disequilibrium de-
velops between socio-behavioural and size preference
alleles, then different size preference alleles can have
different means and variances in the proportion of co-
operators they experience, As a control, the possibility
of linkage disequilibrium developing can be removed
by replacing Aγ=z and Nγ=z with A and N, the count
of cooperators over all size preference alleles, and the
total population size, respectively.
The function h(z,a) gives the distribution of indi-
viduals to groups at each group formation (aggrega-
tion) stage. After group formation, reproduction and
selection occur within each group for T generations.
In each generation the number of cooperators (a) and
selfish individuals (s) in a group, and hence the size of
the group (n), change in a manner that is sensitive to
the proportion of cooperators in that group, according
to the following recursive equations:
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at = at−1
(
1+w0 +ρa (at−1,nt−1)
)
(2)
st = st−1
(
1+w0 +ρs (at−1,nt−1)
)
(3)
nt = at + st (4)
where ρa(at−1,nt−1), defined below, is the fitness
payoff that a cooperator in a group of size n with
a− 1 other cooperators receives from social interac-
tions, ρs(at−1,nt−1), also defined below, is the fitness
payoff a selfish individual in the same group receives,
and w0 is a baseline fitness in the absence of social
interactions. We allow a, s, and n to take continuous
values, such that offspring counts are not converted to
an integer but are left as a real number (they are, how-
ever, rounded to an integer when applying Equation 1
to generate the distribution of groups at the start of a
new cycle).
Finally the number of cooperators in the global pop-
ulation with size preference allele γ = z, Aγ=z, at the
end of an aggregation and dispersal cycle, d, (i.e.,
after group formation by Equation 1, and T genera-
tions of reproduction and fitness-proportionate selec-
tion within groups given by T iterations of equations 2-
4) is given by:
Aγ=z =
z
∑
i=0
h(z, i)aT (i). (5)
This is the number of cooperators contributed to the
global population by all possible groups of founding
size z, multiplied by the expected count of that type
of group (where the number of cooperators when the
group is founded, i, varies from 0 to z, and aT (i) is the
number of cooperators contributed by a group founded
by i cooperators and z− i selfish individuals, after T it-
erations of equations 2- 4). Likewise, the total number
of selfish individuals with size preference allele z after
T generations within groups is:
Sγ=z =
z
∑
i=0
h(z, i)sT (i). (6)
Our model consists of repeated iterations of equa-
tions 5 and 6 (which depend on quantities from equa-
tions 1- 4), corresponding to repeated aggregation and
dispersal cycles.
Within-group payoff functions
We model the fitness payoffs that cooperative pro-
ducers and selfish non-producers of the public good
within a group receive using the n-player Prisoner’s
Dilemma and Snowdrift games (Doebeli and Hauert
2005), where n is the group size. The difference
between the n-player Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snow-
drift games is whether selection on social behaviour
is directional towards selfish behaviour at fixation, or
is negative frequency-dependent leading to a poly-
morphism of behaviours. Our prior work suggests
that these different types of selection on social be-
haviour within groups will have important effects on
whether the second assumption of our logical argu-
ment holds, i.e., on whether small mutational differ-
ences in population structure will select for differ-
ing amounts of cooperation (Powers et al. 2008), and
hence allow positive linkage disequilibrium between
cooperative and population-structuring alleles to de-
velop. The n-player Prisoner’s Dilemma represents
the standard conception of altruism in evolutionary
biology (Fletcher and Zwick 2007), whereby selfish
non-producers are always fitter than cooperative pro-
ducers within their same group. This is despite the
fact that group productivity increases with the propor-
tion of cooperators, thereby creating a tragedy of the
commons situation (Hardin 1968, 1971; Rankin et al.
2007) in which selection is directional towards all in-
dividuals being selfish non-producers. However, an-
other scenario is that cooperative producers are fitter
at low frequency, and less fit at high frequency, lead-
ing to a polymorphism of cooperative and selfish be-
haviours within a group. This can occur when cooper-
ators are able to internalise some of the good that they
produce, such that they receive a greater per capita
share of the benefits. However, if the cost remains
fixed, but the benefit of the good tails off with increas-
ing frequency, then above a threshold frequency self-
ish individuals will become fitter (Hauert et al. 2006).
This describes a negative frequency-dependent selec-
tion scenario, leading to a polymorphism of coopera-
tive and selfish behaviours within a social group.
The payoff matrix for the 2-player version of both
the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift games is shown
in Table 1. Under this payoff structure, cooperators
provide a benefit b to themselves and their social part-
ner, at a cost to themselves of c. If their partner also
cooperates, however, then the cost is shared (c/2).
When 0.5< b/c< 1, this payoff structure produces the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, representing directional selection
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favouring selfish behaviour. Conversely, when b/c> 1
the Snowdrift game, representing negative frequency-
dependent selection, is produced(Doebeli and Hauert
2005). The payoffs from pairwise interactions in Ta-
ble 1 are generalised to social groups of size n by treat-
ing each group as a well-mixed population, such that
pairs of individuals within the group interact at ran-
dom. In this case, each individual experiences the
proportion of cooperators within its social group. We
thus multiply the fitness payoffs for interacting with
a certain type of individual (cooperative or selfish)
with the proportion of that type within the focal in-
dividual’s group (note that other generalisations of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift games to n-players
are possible that produce the same dynamics of direc-
tional or frequency-dependent selection within social
groups, respectively; see, for example, Hauert et al.
2006). Doing so yields the following payoff function
for individuals within a social group, where a/n is the
proportion of cooperators (p) within the group:
ρa (a,n) =
a
n
(
b− c
2
)
+
(
1−
a
n
)
(b− c) , (7)
ρs (a,n) =
a
n
b. (8)
In both the Snowdrift and Prisoner’s Dilemma pa-
rameterisations of these functions, individual selection
within a group leads to an outcome that is subopti-
mal for the group, in terms of mean fitness of the
group members. Specifically, although in both scenar-
ios 100% cooperate provides the highest mean fitness,
in the Snowdrift game the equilibrium frequency of
cooperators in an unstructured population is less than
100%, and in the Prisoner’s Dilemma case it is zero.
Thus, both games describe social dilemmas in which
group and individual interests are not aligned. The plot
of equations 7 and 8 in Figure 1 illustrates this graphi-
cally.
If these payoff functions were iterated within a sin-
gle group until an equilibrium was reached, then the
proportion of cooperators within that one group would
be 1 − c/(2b − c) (Doebeli and Hauert 2005). This
corresponds to the selfish allele at fixation within the
group under the Prisoner’s Dilemma parameterisation,
and a stable polymorphism of cooperative and self-
ish alleles under the Snowdrift game parameterisation.
Thus, selection on social behaviour is directional in
the first case, and negative frequency-dependent in the
second. Crucially, however, the social groups in our
model stay together for only t generations before dis-
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Fig. 1.— Per capita fitness as a function of the fre-
quency of the cooperative allele within the group in
a) Prisoner’s Dilemma (i.e., b/c = 0.9), b) Snow-
drift (b/c = 1.1), games. A polymorphic within-group
equilibrium exists in the Snowdrift, but not Prisoner’s
Dilemma, game. A polymorphic equilibrium is indi-
cated graphically where the lines of the fitness func-
tions cross, meaning that both types have equal fitness.
persing and mixing. Hence, if t is small then the equi-
librium allele frequencies for a single group will not be
reached. Rather, different groups may contain differ-
ent proportions of cooperators at the dispersal stage.
Because cooperation raises mean fitness (the greater
the value of a/n, the greater the payoff to all group
members in equations 7- 8; Figure 1), groups with a
greater proportion of cooperators will contribute more
individuals into the global population at the disper-
sal stage. In this way, population structure can affect
the global equilibrium frequency of cooperation. Dis-
persal before the within-group equilibrium frequencies
are reached is necessary for such an effect to occur
(Wilson 1987; West et al. 2002), hence T cannot be too
large if population structure is to affect selection on so-
cial behaviour in this model. Existing theory predicts
that the effect of population structure in this model
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Table 1: Fitness payoff matrix for the Snowdrift and Prisoner’s Dilemma games (Doebeli and Hauert 2005). This
payoff structure produces directional selection for selfish behaviour within a group (the Prisoner’s Dilemma) when
0.5 < b/c < 1, and negative frequency-dependent selection leading to a polymorphism of cooperative and selfish
behaviours (the Snowdrift game) when b/c > 1.
Cooperate Selfish
Payoff to Cooperate b− c/2 b− c
Payoff to Selfish b 0
should peak with an intermediate number of genera-
tions spent within groups (Wilson and Colwell 1981;
Wilson 1987; Fletcher and Zwick 2004). However at
least in the case of the Snowdrift game, which repre-
sents a kind of weak altruism where cooperation in-
creases the absolute fitness of the actor, we would still
expect an effect of population structure when T = 1
(Wilson 1975, 1980).
Our use of game theoretic payoff functions does
have the limitation that it assumes discrete cooperative
and selfish phenotypes, rather than the more realistic
case of the social phenotype representing a continuous
degree of investment in the public good, or the proba-
bility that an individual contributes. On the other hand,
the game theoretic payoff functions that we use pro-
vide a means to capture both directional and negative-
frequency dependent selection through a simple pa-
rameterisation, thereby allowing for their comparison
without changing any other aspect of the model.
Numerical analysis
We examine the generation of linkage disequi-
librium between socio-behavioural and population-
structuring alleles, and the consequent selection for
small founding group sizes that support coopera-
tion, below. Closed form analysis for the gener-
ation of linkage disequilibrium in a social setting
is known to be non-trivial (Roze and Rousset 2005;
Hochberg et al. 2008), especially when one of the fo-
cal loci affects population structure and hence relat-
edness at the other locus (Gardner et al. 2007). For
example, the commonly used “direct fitness” method
of Taylor and Frank (1996) does not describe the de-
velopment of associations between loci (Gardner et al.
2007; Hochberg et al. 2008). Tracking the develop-
ment of these associations, however, is fundamen-
tal for illustrating our logical argument. To obtain
a closed form analytical solution that illustrates our
argument, we would thus need a higher-order approx-
imation that can explicitly account for changing group
size and the generation of linkage disequilibrium. But
at present, no such approximation is available. In par-
ticular, Gardner et al. (2007) have recently provided
a sophisticated analytical methodology for tracking
the generation of linkage disequilibrium in a social
setting, but acknowledge that further development is
required to yield a general approach for tracking the
evolution of relatedness. Thus, we analyse our model
through numerical iteration of equations 5 and 6 (see
also Peck and Feldman 1988, Breden and Wade 1991,
Avile´s 2002 and Hochberg et al. 2008 for numerical
and individual-based simulation treatments of the gen-
eration of linkage disequilibrium in a social setting).
This allows us to explicitly track and account for the
generation of linkage disequilibrium during the tran-
sients as well as at equilibrium, as required. Our re-
sults below show that the behaviour on the transients
is fundamental to understanding the conditions under
which population structure will evolve to support co-
operation.
Our approach is to consider a population initially
fixed for a large group size preference allele, repre-
senting low between-group variance and hence little
selection for cooperation, and then examine conditions
under which mutant smaller group size alleles will be
selected and increase between-group variance and se-
lection for cooperation. To do so, we introduce a mu-
tation operator into our model. Additional details are
provided in Appendix 1.
Parameter settings
The parameter settings stated in Table 2 are used for
the simulations presented below. We set c = 1, with
b = 0.9 to yield Prisoner’s Dilemma interactions, and
b = 1.1 to produce a Snowdrift scenario (this is close
to the qualitative threshold between the two types of
selection on social behaviour that occurs at b/c = 1).
In all of the simulations, we follow a population of to-
tal size N = 1000, through 6000 group formation and
dispersal cycles (preliminary experimentation revealed
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that this was a sufficient length of time for a global
equilibrium of genotype frequencies to be reached, and
the significant changes occur within the first 2000 cy-
cles). We record the allelic and genotype frequencies
averaged over 100 independent simulations. Group
dispersal is set to occur after t = 5 generations of se-
lection and reproduction within groups. We start the
population initially fixed for a size preference allele of
20, with the cooperative allele at an initial frequency
of 0% in the Prisoner’s Dilemma case, and 16.67%
in the Snowdrift case (these are the equilibrium fre-
quencies of the coopeerative allele in the simulations
if group size is fixed at 20 and does not evolve, taken
from the last 1000 aggregation and dispersal cycles
and averaged over 100 runs). A fraction of M = 0.01
individuals are mutated in the migrant pool between
cycles. For those individuals chosen to undergo mu-
tation, their size preference allele is mutated with a
probability m = 0.9, otherwise their socio-behavioural
allele is mutated.
Directional selection on social behaviour represented
by the Prisoner’s Dilemma within groups
We have investigated whether an individual adap-
tive gradient towards cooperative groups with high re-
latedness exists, and whether it can be followed when
new group size preference alleles arise at mutation fre-
quency. We first studied the case where selection on
social behaviour is directional, representing a tragedy
of the commons within groups, which we model using
the n-player Prisoner’s Dilemma as defined above. Our
results show that, from an initial value of 20, the equi-
librium mean size preference allele was close to the
minimum possible (our results show numerically that
this is an equilibrium, since recurring mutations occur
on both group size preference and socio-behavioural
alleles from this state, but do not cause a shift in the
population mean) , (Figure 2(a)), i.e., 1, with the co-
operative allele reaching fixation apart from recurring
mutations (Figure 2(c)). A founding group size of 1
maximises the relatedness of group members in sub-
sequent generations (since all group members will be
descendants of that one ancestor), and hence selects
for maximal cooperation according to Hamilton’s rule
(Hamilton 1964). Thus, the equilibrium population
structure is the one that selects for maximal cooper-
ation. This result agrees with the logical argument in-
troduced at the beginning of this paper. In particular,
there is no other component of selection on the group
size allele apart from that induced indirectly by selec-
tion on social behaviour. That is, group size only en-
ters into equations 2- 3 and 7- 8 when calculating the
proportion of cooperators within the group – it has no
other intrinsic effect and so cannot create a selection
differential except through its effect on cooperation.
Thus, because there is no other component of selec-
tion on the group size allele, a size allele which selects
for, and hence exhibits positive linkage disequilibrium
with, cooperation is favoured over one which does not.
To verify that selection for a smaller size allele
would not occur without the generation of positive
linkage disequilibrium with cooperation, we removed
the possibility for sustained linkage disequilibrium.
We did this by forming groups based on the size pref-
erence allele as before, but by drawing the behavioural
alleles for a given group from the global frequen-
cies, rather than using those of the participating geno-
types. Thus, each group would centre around the
global mean frequency of cooperation, rather than on
the mean for its particular size. With this change to
the model, there was no significant evolution of the
group size allele, and the cooperative allele did not
increase in frequency. Although cooperation is more
frequent when averaged over small groups compared
to large groups prior to the dispersal stage, this ad-
vantage is lost when the next generation of groups are
formed, since any increase in cooperation is distributed
across all group sizes uniformly. Thus, although indi-
viduals with smaller size alleles create the conditions
for greater cooperation, they do not preferentially re-
ceive the benefits of this cooperation, and so do not
have their fitness increased relative to individuals with
larger size alleles. On the other hand, in the normal
model linkage disequilibrium is generated between the
alleles, and this allows group size alleles that create the
conditions for cooperation to preferentially enjoy the
consequent benefits.
Closer inspection of the results where linkage dise-
quilibrium develops shows that the selection pressure
favouring small groups is punctuated, not gradual. The
plot of size allele frequencies over time in Figure 3(a)
shows that in the initial stages there is no significant
component of selection pressure on population struc-
ture. Specifically, the allele frequencies do not gradu-
ally shift downwards as mutations accumulate, instead,
size preferences spread out equally in both directions
until such a time as a preference for very small groups
arises by mutation, at which point that very small size
allele rapidly fixes in the population. This is shown
by both Figure 3(a) and the step change in the mean
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Table 2: Model parameter settings.
Parameter Value
Cost to cooperating, c 1
Benefit to cooperating (Prisoner’s Dilemma), b 0.9
Benefit to cooperating (Snowdrift), b 1.1
Fraction of population mutated, M 0.01
Probability any mutation is on size preference allele, m 0.9
Generations within groups before dispersal, t 5
Value of size allele fixed in initial population 20
Smallest possible size allele 1
Largest possible size allele 40
Frequency of cooperative allele in migrant pool at initialisation (Prisoner’s
Dilemma)
0
Frequency of cooperative allele in migrant pool at initialisation (Snowdrift) 0.1667
Gradient of sigmoidal fitness bonus function from Allee effect, µ 0.4
Determinant of maximum benefit from Allee effect, β 1
Migrant pool density, N 1000
Number of aggregation and dispersal cycles, T 6000
value of the size allele in Figure 2(a), which illustrates
that no significant selection occurs until a very small
size preference is reached (we show independent rep-
resentative runs rather than the mean in Figure 2(a) to
highlight this step change, which would be smoothed
out when taking an average over multiple runs, since
it happens at different times on different runs due to
the stochasticity of the mutation process). The fact
that the allele frequencies initially spread out in both
directions shows that no significant adaptive gradient
on this allele is present at the start. This implies that
small, cooperative, groups might not evolve at all if
the starting group size is much larger than the 20 we
use. This is despite the fact that the mean fitness of
individuals would be higher in such groups, due to the
benefits of cooperation.
Why, then, is there no significant selection pressure
on founding group size in the initial stages? If a mu-
tant smaller size preference is to be selectively advan-
tageous, it must be the case that groups of that size
have members which experience a greater frequency
of cooperation than those of the current size. This
follows immediately from equations 2- 3 and 7- 8,
since any differential fitness for bearers of the same be-
havioural allele must result from them experiencing a
different frequency of cooperation (i.e., a different av-
erage value of a/n in their groups); there are no other
sources of differential fitness in equations 2- 3 and 7- 8.
So, for an adaptive gradient to exist, groups of found-
ing size z− 1 must enjoy more cooperation than those
of size z (Powers et al. 2008). The solid line in Fig-
ure 4 explores this in the case where social interac-
tions follow an n-player Prisoner’s Dilemma, by calcu-
lating the frequency of cooperation in the global pop-
ulation over a range of non-evolving founding group
sizes (taken over the last 1000 cycles, and averaged
over 100 runs for each group size), with all other pa-
rameters the same as in the previous simulation (i.e.,
no assortment on behaviour during group formation, 5
generations within groups between dispersal episodes,
and b/c = 0.9). This shows that, for γ = z > 6, no
adaptive gradient on the size allele can exist, since
above this threshold moving to a slightly smaller group
size does not increase cooperation, and so size allele
γ = z− 1 cannot, on average, be fitter than size allele
γ = z. That is, the between-group component of selec-
tion on social behaviour is no greater when groups are
of founding size z− 1 than when they are of founding
size z. This threshold for the start of an adaptive gra-
dient can also be seen in Figure 3(a), where allele fre-
quencies only became concentrated around a few val-
ues once mutants with a size preference of 5 or less
had arisen. These results suggest that an adaptive gra-
dient towards the population structures favouring co-
operation will only exist from a small range of initial
conditions. However, we show in the next section that
this is a consequence of assuming directional selection
on social behaviour.
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Fig. 2.— Concurrent evolution of founding group size
preference and cooperation with no direct selection on
group size. A) Mean value of size preference allele
under Prisoner’s Dilemma interactions (directional se-
lection on social behaviour) in 5 independent runs. B)
Mean value of size preference allele under Snowdrift
interactions (negative frequency-dependent selection
on social behaviour in 5 independent runs. C) Propor-
tion of cooperative allele in global population, aver-
aged over 30 runs (error bars show the standard error).
Negative frequency-dependent selection on social be-
haviour represented by the Snowdrift game within
groups
As previously discussed directional selection against
cooperation, as modelled by the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
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Fig. 3.— A) Size allele frequency evolution during
a typical run under Prisoner’s Dilemma interactions
(lighter shades represent greater frequency of the al-
lele value in the population). B) Size allele frequency
evolution during a typical run under Snowdrift interac-
tions.
represents a worst-case scenario. Rather, the nature
of cooperation may be such that selection is negative-
frequency dependent, supporting a polymorphism of
behaviours within groups. To investigate the effects of
this kind of selection on the evolution of group size, we
changed b/c from 0.9 to 1.1 to produce the n-player
Snowdrift game, and then reran the experiments in the
previous section. The equilibrium mean initial group
size is the same as under directional selection, that is,
very close to 1, which in turn selects for maximal co-
operation between group members during subsequent
group growth. However, as figures 2(b) and 3(b) show,
the dynamics on the transient to reach this equilibrium
are very different. Rather than the size preference al-
lele spreading out in both directions, the mass of the
allele frequencies show a trend of moving downwards
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Fig. 4.— Global proportion of cooperative allele
at equilibrium, for different (non-evolving) founding
group sizes. The solid line shows results where se-
lection on social behaviour is directional towards self-
ishness within a group (the Prisoner’s Dilemma). The
dashed line shows results where selection on social be-
haviour within groups is instead negative frequency-
dependent (the Snowdrift game).
from the start, suggesting the presence of an adaptive
gradient towards a population structure that supports
cooperation from the outset.
To confirm this, we again considered whether a
mutation from group size preference γ = z to γ = z−1
would increase the amount of cooperation its bearers
experienced. The dashed line in Figure 4 shows that if
all groups are of (founding) size z = 20, then decreas-
ing group size by 1 always yields some increase in co-
operation. The question is then: why does this occur
under Snowdrift, but not Prisoner’s Dilemma, interac-
tions? We have shown elsewhere (Powers et al. 2008;
Powers 2010) that negative frequency-dependent se-
lection on social behaviour maintains some between-
group variance over a much larger range of condi-
tions than if selection is directional. This is because
between-group variance is proportional to the fre-
quency of the least common behavioural allele in the
population (if social behaviours are distributed bino-
mially when groups are formed then the between-
group variance at the first generation is P(1 − P)/z;
Wilson 1980), and while this tends to zero under di-
rectional selection, it does not do so under negative
frequency-dependence (Powers et al. 2008; Powers
2010). This preservation of between-group variance
means that some between-group component of selec-
tion on social behaviour can be seen over a much larger
range of conditions and, consequently, moving to a
slightly smaller initial group size increases coopera-
tion over a much larger range.
The results presented so far are from a model in
which there is no direct selection on the group size
preference allele. This has allowed us to show that
cooperation can exert indirect selection pressure on
group size preference, driving its evolution. However,
we might expect there to be other direct components of
selection on group size preference. In the next section,
we introduce a revised model in which there is such
direction selection on group size. Moreover, the di-
rection of this direct selection is in opposition to the
indirect selection from cooperation, thereby making
the evolution of a group size that supports cooperation
more challenging.
Analysis with an opposing component of selection on
population structure due to an Allee effect
We introduce here a direct component of selection
into the model that favours larger groups, represent-
ing a (weak) Allee effect (Allee 1938; Odum and Allee
1954; Avile´s 1999). A larger founding group size may
be favoured by, for example, better defence against
predators, or access to resources that a smaller group
cannot obtain (Avile´s 1999). Such factors create a
component of selection pressure on population struc-
ture that is in a direction opposite to that from social
traits (i.e., they tend to reduce relatedness by creating
pressure for a larger founding size). Consequently, this
makes the evolution of population structures that sup-
port cooperation more difficult.
This component of selection is represented by the
following, positive density-dependent, function of
group size, σ(n):
σ(n) =
β
1+ e−µn
−
β
2
. (9)
σ(n) is a sigmoidal function of group size, with
gradient µ (which determines how quickly the ben-
efit tails off as the group grows), and β a parameter
which determines the maximum benefit. A sigmoidal
function of group size is used to model the fact that,
above a certain size, the advantages of number be-
come cancelled out by the effects of increased crowd-
ing (Odum and Allee 1954; Avile´s 1999). This direct
selection on group size is incorporated into the model
by replacing equations 2- 3 with the following:
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at = at−1
(
1+w0 +ρa (at−1,nt−1 +σ(n))
)
, (10)
st = st−1
(
1+w0 +ρs (at−1,nt−1 +σ(n))
)
, (11)
To obtain the numerical results presented below, we
set µ = 0.4 and β = 1. In the absence of any possi-
bility for cooperation, a founding group size of 20 or
greater would be favoured using these parameter set-
tings for the sigmoidal function, since this is the group
size for which the gradient reaches zero. However,
given that group size can affect selection for cooper-
ation, individual fitness would actually be increased
with a smaller group size that produces more between-
group variance, and hence selects for greater coopera-
tion. We investigate below whether an adaptive gradi-
ent towards such an intermediate group size exists.
The results in Figure 5 show how the evolution
of founding group size is affected by the incorpora-
tion of an Allee effect. Founding group size prefer-
ence evolves downwards, and between-group variance
and hence cooperation increase, under Snowdrift but
not Prisoner’s Dilemma types of interaction (figures
5(a), 5(b) and 5(c)). This is because under Prisoner’s
Dilemma interactions, no selection on the size prefer-
ence allele due to social behaviour exists from the ini-
tial state (Figure 6(a)), in accordance with our previous
results. Because of the opposing selective force to-
wards larger groups generated by the Allee effect, the
size preference allele is no longer able to drift down-
wards. On the other hand, under Snowdrift interactions
an adaptive gradient towards a smaller size preference
still exists (Figure 6(b)). Thus, these results highlight
the importance of a small change in population struc-
ture causing an increase in cooperation. Without this,
the evolution of population structures that support co-
operation must rely on drift, which cannot overcome
any opposing component of selection.
Interestingly, Figure 5(a) suggests that the mean
value of the size preference allele starts to increase
again under Snowdrift interactions once the coopera-
tive allele has reached a high frequency. This is be-
cause at the end of a run linkage disequilibrium ex-
ists between the size preference and behavioural al-
leles, such that the selfish allele is associated with a
large size preference, and the cooperative allele with a
small preference, as predicted by our logical argument.
Specifically, the selfish allele can only be maintained
in large groups with little between-group variance. It
is this association of the selfish allele with a larger size
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Fig. 5.— Concurrent evolution of founding group
size preference and cooperation with a direct opposing
component of selection on population structure pro-
vided by an Allee effect. Error bars show standard
error from 100 independent trials. A) Mean value of
size allele. B) Cooperative allele frequency in popula-
tion. C) Evolution of between-group variance.
preference that pushes the mean value of the size al-
lele slightly upwards towards the end of a run. We
calculated the linkage disequilibrium at the end of a
run (using Lewontin and Kojima’s (1960) normalised
method), averaged over 100 trials, to be 0.62 (by con-
trast under Prisoner’s Dilemma interactions the link-
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age disequilibrium was 0.12).
Sensitivity analysis
We have illustrated how a trait affecting the popu-
lation structure of its bearers can evolve concurrently
with social behaviour, and how a sharp qualitative dis-
tinction arises between Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snow-
drift style social interactions. In particular, the dis-
tinction is over whether a small change in popula-
tion structure induces greater cooperation, and hence
is selectively advantageous. The quantitative range
in which this is true depends upon the area of pa-
rameter space over which a small change in group
size increases between-group variance. In the model
presented here, the other factors apart from founding
group size that determine this are the initial state of
the population (size preference and cooperation allele
frequencies), the degree of assortativity on behaviour
during group formation, the number of generations
spent within groups before dispersal, and the cost-to-
benefit ratio of cooperating. All of these factors matter,
however, only in so far as they change the quantita-
tive range over which small mutations on group size
induce greater cooperation; the logical argument pre-
sented here still holds for other settings of these param-
eters. In a similar manner, the parameters of the Allee
effect in Equation 9 determine the trade-off between
the advantages of smaller initial size arising from se-
lection for greater cooperation, versus the raw bene-
fits of living with more individuals. However, while
the exact position of this trade-off determines the fi-
nal size preference that will evolve, it does not affect
the qualitative result that the opportunity for coopera-
tion can drive the evolution of population structure, nor
the distinction between Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snow-
drift style social interactions. We thus do not wish to
make claims with respect to the quantitative results of
our simulations. The purpose of our model is not to
make quantitative predictions, but to illustrate our log-
ical argument and examine qualitative aspects of this
process.
Discussion
At the beginning of this article, we argued that
cooperation could drive the evolution of population
structure. The model presented above provides a
simple illustration of this argument, for the particu-
lar population-structuring trait of founding group size
preference. The model illustrates how a genetic prefer-
ence for a smaller founding size can evolve because it
increases between-group variance, and hence increases
the benefits of cooperation that its bearers experience.
In particular, the cooperative allele is selected for more
strongly in smaller groups than in larger groups. Be-
cause the individuals in smaller groups tend to be those
that have a genetic preference for such groups, the co-
operative allele becomes linked, by selection, to small
group size preference alleles. Since cooperation by
definition raises mean fitness, the mean fitness of indi-
viduals with both the small group size and cooperation
alleles is greater than the population mean fitness, so
these genotypes increase in frequency.
This argument hinges on the development of link-
age disequilibrium between small size preference and
cooperative alleles. For this to occur by selection,
smaller groups must select for a greater degree of
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cooperation, since the only source of differential fit-
ness in the model (with no Allee effect) is that caused
by experiencing different amounts of the benefits of
cooperation (different mean p values within groups).
This is an instance of the general assumption of our
logical argument, that different population structures
must induce selection for different amounts of cooper-
ation. Our results illustrate that whether selection on
social behaviour within groups is directional or nega-
tive frequency-dependent is an important determinant
of whether this assumption is likely to hold true. This
is because directional selection, modelled here by the
n-player Prisoner’s Dilemma, necessarily limits the
range of conditions over which some between-group
variance can be generated (Powers et al. 2008; Powers
2010). Consequently, this limits the range over which
a small change in population structure can increase
between-group variance and hence select for greater
cooperation.
There is a growing interest in whether selection
for cooperation is directional or negative frequency-
dependent in a range of biological scenarios (Doebeli and Hauert
2005). Gore et al. (2009) have recently verified empir-
ically that the public goods scenario of extra-cellular
enzyme production in yeast does indeed follow a
Snowdrift game. In the context of bacterial biofilms,
Dugatkin et al. (2003, 2005a,b) have presented the-
oretical and empirical work arguing that antibiotic
resistance is a public good that similarly undergoes
negative frequency-dependent rather than directional
selection, and hence follows a Snowdrift rather than
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Similarly, Burmolle et al.
(2006) suggest that antibiotic resistance is a synergis-
tic cooperative trait between multiple species, which
again show a local coexistence of multiple types,
rather than the competitive exclusion of the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma. In the arthropod phylum, it has
been shown that the success of social spiders who
cheat during foraging is locally limited, suggesting
negative frequency-dependent selection. In the case
of mammals, Doebeli and Hauert (2005) suggest that
collective hunting in lions and baboons, and sen-
tinel behaviour in meerkats, may for example also
fit the n-player Snowdrift game. Our results imply
that the evolution of population structure towards that
which supports cooperation is much more plausible
in these kinds of systems, as opposed to cases of
strong altruism (Wilson 1980) represented by the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma. We suggest, however, that whilst
cooperative traits which undergo negative frequency-
dependent selection could initially drive the evolution
of population structure, this evolved population struc-
ture could then provide a high enough relatedness to
support the evolution of strongly altruistic traits. Thus,
weakly altruistic traits subject to negative frequency-
dependent selection (the Snowdrift game) could, by
inducing selection on population structure, scaffold
the subsequent evolution of strong altruism (the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma). Through this mechanism, such traits
may play an important role in the origin of high levels
of sociality (Powers 2010).
Our results can be understood in either a kin or
group selection framework. In particular, the metric
of between-group variance is equivalent to that of ge-
netic relatedness, since relatedness is a measure of the
correlation in behaviour between individuals within a
social group compared to individuals chosen from the
global population (Grafen 1984; Queller 1985, 1992).
We have shown here how selection on traits affecting
population structure can lead to an increased related-
ness between interacting individuals, and hence how a
population structure that supports cooperation accord-
ing to Hamilton’s rule (Hamilton 1964) can evolve.
Thus, whilst Hamilton’s rule predicts the conditions
for cooperation to evolve, we have shown here how a
population structure that satisfies those conditions can
arise by adaptive evolution.
The joint evolution of population structure and so-
cial behaviour has also been considered in the con-
text of the origin of multicellularity. Roze and Michod
(2001) showed that when selfish mutations occur dur-
ing the growth of clonal colonies (representing proto-
multicellular organisms), it can be selectively advan-
tageous for the group of cells to reproduce by break-
ing off single cells, rather than larger propagules of
multiple cells. The reason for this is the same as
in our model: a smaller initial group size increases
between-group variance and hence reduces selection
for selfish behaviour. We argue that this is in fact a
general trend in the evolution of population structure,
and our numerical model explicitly tracks the genera-
tion of linkage disequilibrium between group size and
social behaviour when new initial group sizes arise
by mutation. Pfeiffer and Bonhoeffer (2003) used an
individual-based simulation to model the co-evolution
of clustering and cooperation between single cells, as
a pathway to the origin of multicellular organisms.
Also in the context of the transition to multicellularity,
Hochberg et al. (2008) considered the concurrent evo-
lution of dispersal and social behaviour and illustrated
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the development of linkage disequilibrium between
social and population-structuring traits. Specifically,
they showed conditions under which selfish behaviour
would become linked with a greater tendency to dis-
perse from the cell group. Such work adds support
to our argument that the generation of linkage dise-
quilibrium between socio-behavioural and population-
structuring traits is a fundamental force in the evo-
lution of population structure, and should be explic-
itly considered when explaining the origin of sociality
(Powers 2010).
We stress again that our logical argument does not
only apply to founding group size. Rather, it applies
to any heritable trait that modifies population structure
so as to cause a difference in selection pressure on so-
cial behaviour between bearers and non-bearers. Our
model was thus designed to provide a simple illustra-
tion of this argument, rather than to apply to any one
system in particular. Nevertheless, it is worth flesh-
ing out how our specific model of the evolution of
founding group size might apply in principle to dif-
ferent social systems. There is recent empirical evi-
dence that high relatedness, resulting from population
structure, is important for the evolution of sociality
in vertebrates (Cornwallis et al. 2010). There is also
evidence that some mammals can actively control the
size of their group, by preventing migrants or solitaires
from joining once the group is larger than their pre-
ferred size (Giraldeau and Caraco 2000, Chapter 4).
Presumably such traits for group size regulation are at
least partly genetic, and hence could co-evolve with
cooperative behaviour in a manner analogous to our
model. Indeed, the existence of a heritable group
size preference has been verified empirically in birds
(Brown and Brown 2000). The degree to which in-
dividuals are able to successfully regulate the size of
their group will affect the degree to which the first as-
sumption of our logical argument is met, i.e., the de-
gree to which individuals with a heritable preference
for a particular population structure are actually able
to live in that structure. As this assumption is relaxed,
for example, due to a cost of group size regulation,
we would expect the generation of less linkage dise-
quilibrium between socio-behavioural and population-
structuring traits, and hence weaker selection towards
the population structures that support cooperation.
Other social systems in which the evolution of
founding group size might naturally apply include
those where groups reproduce by propagule or fis-
sioning. In these systems, which include social spider
colonies (Avile´s 1993), and bacterial micro-colonies
within biofilms (Hall-Stoodley et al. 2004), a new
group is founded by a small sample of individuals
from a single parent colony. The size of these found-
ing propagules could potentially be affected by indi-
vidual genetic traits, for example, by the amount of
extra-cellular matrix secreted by bacteria in a biofilm.
Thus, propagule size could co-evolve with social be-
haviour. In the next section, we discuss in detail how
our theory of public goods production driving the evo-
lution of founding group size can be tested empirically
in bacterial biofilms.
Empirical hypotheses testable in bacterial biofilms
Biofilms are formed when bacteria attach to a
surface or interface and form large aggregate struc-
tures bound together by a co-produced extra-cellular
matrix. They, rather than individual motile cells,
are the most common mode of bacterial growth
(Ghannoum and O’Toole 2004). They often exhibit
a marked group structure, whereby bacteria within
the biofilm tend to live in discrete micro-colonies
(Hall-Stoodley et al. 2004) and moreover, produce and
share various extra-cellular public goods (Crespi 2001;
West et al. 2007b). There has recently been much in-
terest in bacterial social evolution (Rainey and Rainey
2003; Griffin et al. 2004; Kreft 2004; Buckling et al.
2007), but crucially previous theory assumes that pop-
ulation structure remains static.
Bacteria in biofilms exhibit a periodic dispersal cy-
cle (Hall-Stoodley et al. 2004), which is reminiscent
of the “Haystack” aggregation and dispersal popula-
tion structure that we have modelled. Micro-colonies
form, grow, and disperse to form new colonies either
via the shearing off of propagules containing varying
numbers of individuals, or by the dispersal of single
cells (Hall-Stoodley et al. 2004). The structure of bac-
terial biofilm is generated by a complex interaction
between ecological, environmental and genetic factors
(Ghannoum and O’Toole 2004; Flemming et al. 2007;
Xavier and Foster 2007). However, as the production
and nature of the extra-cellular polymers are geneti-
cally mediated, there is a strong possibility that disper-
sal mode and cooperation could co-evolve. In particu-
lar, we might expect that the factors affecting the bal-
ance between single cell and propagule dispersal, and
mechanical and structural features of the extra-cellular
matrix which affect propagule size, might be subject
to the effect which we have described.
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Micro-colony size and dispersal will be affected by
a number of factors including shear stress, resource
availability and competition. However, we predict that
the creation of specific biofilm structure is at least par-
tially driven by the benefits of cooperation. For exam-
ple, the model suggests that smaller propagule size or
increased dispersal of individual cells might evolve in
response to the need for public goods production to be
supported. This hypothesis could potentially be tested
empirically by manipulating the need for a particu-
lar public good, such as siderophore production (see
also Brockhurst et al. 2010 for complementary the-
ory of how resource availability may change the cost
and benefits of cooperation in biofilms). Siderophores
are extracellular iron-scavenging molecules that are
costly to produce, in terms of time and energy, but
which aid bacterial metabolism in stressful low iron
environments (Varma and Chincholkar 2007). Non-
siderophore producing cheats arise in vivo and would
be assumed to prefer unstructured populations. If the
need for siderophores is removed, for example by pro-
viding a saturation of iron, then average propagule
size or propagule/single cell dispersal ratio may in-
crease over numerous dispersal/recolonisation cycles
due to the removal of the benefits of cooperation. This
could occur either via drift or the upward pressure on
size from any Allee effect. Indeed, a recent investi-
gation into the evolution of extra-cellular matrix pro-
duction (Xavier and Foster 2007) implies the presence
of such a selective force favouring greater matrix pro-
duction, and hence potentially greater propagule size
or reduced single-cell dispersal.
If iron is then made limiting once again via the ad-
dition of iron-chelating proteins, then propagule size
should evolve back downwards, since siderophore pro-
duction would again become beneficial, and more of
this benefit would be bestowed upon individuals with
traits leading to smaller propagule sizes and increased
between-micro-colony variance. Thus, siderophore
production should become linked with such traits,
driving selection for smaller propagules. It should be
noted that although we might expect the morphology
of the biofilm to change in response to such differences
in resource availability simply via ecological effects,
we should be able to distinguish between these effects
and evolutionary change. Rapid ecological responses
should reverse quickly when we revert back to the
original experimental scenario. We would expect that
genetic change influencing population structure would
display an increased latency when switching between
regimes.
Conclusions
We argue that considering the concurrent evolution
of population structure and social behaviour in general
provides a fundamental new perspective on the evo-
lution of cooperation. In previous theories, where the
population structure is static, cooperation is simply the
adaptation of organisms’ social behaviour to their cur-
rent social environment. However, we argue that to ex-
plain the evolutionary origin of cooperation, it is nec-
essary to explain why organisms live in that particular
social environment, rather than in one that does not
support cooperative behaviour. In this article, we have
explicitly considered the joint equilibrium of popula-
tion structure and social behaviour, and have shown
how and why organisms move from living in a so-
cial environment little conducive to cooperation, to one
where cooperative behaviour predominates. Thus, we
can provide an explanation for the origin of a selective
environment that supports cooperation, from whence,
the evolution of cooperation itself is straightforward.
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Appendix 1: Simulation procedure
Our numerical analysis of the model consists of a
combination of individual-based and numerical simu-
lation. Specifically, we assume that the migrant pool
contains a finite number of discrete individuals. We
model haploid genotypes with two loci, which repro-
duce asexually (i.e., with no recombination between
loci). The first locus is biallelic and codes for whether
an individual produces a public good at some unilat-
eral cost. The second locus codes for an initial group
size preference. A multi-allelic integer representation
is used for this locus, which in the analysis presented
here can take values between 1 and 40. Groups are
formed by the following individual-based procedure,
which approximates Equation 1 while allowing for a
finite number of individuals:
1. Create a list of all individuals in the migrant
pool.
2. Sort this list in reverse order of group size pref-
erence, such that the individuals with the largest
size preference are at the front of the list. Within
each sub-list of individuals with the same size
preference, randomise their position in the list
with respect to their social behaviour (coopera-
tive or selfish).
3. Create a new group, and add the individual at the
front of the list to this group. Remove the added
individual from the list.
4. Continue adding individuals in order from the
list, while the following condition is met: the
mean size preference of the group members is
less than the current group size. When this con-
dition does not hold, advance to step 5.
5. If there are still individuals in the list, go back to
step 3, else all groups have been formed.
Regarding step 2 in this algorithm, randomising the
order of each sub-list of individuals with the same size
allele means that the behaviours are assigned to groups
according to a hypergeometric distribution, and not
assortatively. More precisely, there is a separate hy-
pergeometric distribution of social behaviour for each
value of the group size allele. Sorting the list in reverse
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size order handles the special case of the last group.
This is because the last group will contain the hand-
ful of remaining individuals in the migrant pool. If the
list was sorted in increasing order, then this last group
would be small but would contain the individuals with
the largest size preference. Sorting in reverse order
means that the small last group contains the individu-
als with the smallest size preference.
Once the groups have been formed, equations 2- 3
are iterated recursively for T timesteps (when calcu-
lating this recursion, a fractional number of individu-
als are allowed within groups). Note that by the above
group formation procedure, a group can contain differ-
ent size preference alleles. However, there is no selec-
tion on the group size allele within groups, and hence
the frequency of the size allele within a group changes
only as a result of selection on social behaviour from
equations 2- 3.
For computational convenience, we introduce a
global population carrying capacity. Thus the total
population size, N, remains fixed. This is achieved
by multiplying at and st , after each iteration of equa-
tions 2- 3, by a factor N/N∗, where N∗ is the new total
population size after equations 2- 3 have been iterated
once for each group (as in Fletcher and Zwick 2004).
This scales group sizes back in a proportionate man-
ner, leaving the proportions of genotypes within each
group the same.
After T iterations of equations 2- 3, all groups dis-
perse into a new global migrant pool (at which point
the number of individuals is rounded to the nearest in-
teger), and mutation occurs as follows.
A fraction M of individuals in the migrant pool are
randomly chosen to be mutated. Of this subset of the
population chosen for mutation, a fraction m have their
size preference allele mutated, the remaining 1 − m
fraction their behavioural allele mutated; only one lo-
cus is mutated per individual, to illustrate that simul-
taneous mutations are not required to decrease group
size and increase cooperation. Mutation on the integer
size preference allele occurs by decreasing its value by
1, with 50% probability, or otherwise it is increased
by 1. If the size allele is already at the upper or lower
limit (40 or 1 with the parmater settings used here, re-
spectively), then it always has 1 subtracted or added,
respectively, if selected for mutation. Mutation on the
biallelic behavioural allele (cooperative or selfish) oc-
curs by switching to the other behaviour.
After mutation has occurred, the next generation of
groups is formed from the migrant pool, and the aggre-
gation and dispersal process is repeated for a sufficient
number of cycles for an equilibrium to be reached.
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